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Abstract
Fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firms’ will-
ingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new
products. This paper studies the interaction between markets for
products and markets for intellectual property rights (patents) where
product innovation requires several complementary patents, each of
which is obtained as the result of a patent race. We show that the
multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem and
we consider which market structure optimally balances the various
incentives that emerge in such a system.
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Many modern consumer goods are produced using multiple, complementary
technology components, which are often protected under a number of patents.
This complementarity in production and in intellectual property generates
several challenges. Heller and Eisenberg (1998), for instance, discuss that
such fragmented property rights defined around gene fragments in biotech-
nology may reduce firms’ incentives to invest and commercialize products:
Foreseeable commercial products, such as therapeutic proteins
or genetic diagnostic tests, are more likely to require the use of
multiple fragments. A proliferation of patents on individual frag-
ments held by different owners seems inevitably to require costly
future transactions to bundle licenses together before a firm can
have an effective right to develop these products. (Heller and
Eisenberg 1998, p.699.)
Other problems with fragmented property rights have been discussed.
Firms that invest in a new product face the risk that, after sinking consid-
erable resources in this, another firm may essentially blackmail this firm by
claiming that this new product infringes on some patent held by this firm.
Ziedonis (2004, p.806) reports the case of Intel in 1998: "After developing
the architecture and tailoring its fabrication facilities to produce the new
chip, Intel was sued by a small communications company, S3, for allegedly
infringing patents S3 had purchased from a failed start-up company."
These examples illustrate that fragmentation of intellectual property rights
is a widespread phenomenon and involves important strategic issues both for
firms and policy makers. Shapiro (2001) discusses arrangements of trading,
licensing or pooling patents to circumvent such problems, and Ziedonis (2004)
2
discusses whether firms may choose to acquire large sets of patents as ’bar-
gaining chips’ to deal with this problem. Lerner and Tirole (2004) discuss
the welfare properties of patent pools. They briefly discuss the implications
of patent pools for innovation, but mostly concentrate on a situation with a
given set of patents.
Much of the literature that focuses on the implications of market struc-
ture for innovation effort considers a sequential structure of innovation, the
incentives to spend R&D effort in a first or in a second stage of a cumulative
innovation, and its policy implications for the allocation rules for the trading
of patents (e.g., Scotchmer 1996, Green and Scotchmer 1995, Denicolo 2002).
We focus on the innovation incentives in a situation similar to the one dis-
cussed by Heller and Eisenberg (1998): several firms can make simultaneous
investments in patents for several or even many technology components, all
of which are needed to innovate and produce a new consumer product. Dy-
namic commitment issues which emerge in sequential R&D, or uncertainty
about a possible infringement when commercializing a new product are ab-
sent from this consideration. We assume that the R&D processes for the
different technology components are random and independent of each other.
For this reason it will often be the case that one firm wins some patents and
a competitor wins the complementary set of patents. In this case, none of
the firms can produce without further arrangements or a reallocation of the
rights to use the information that is protected by the patents. The compe-
tition between two firms, A and B, that takes place for n complementary
patents has essentially three outcomes: A owns all patents and receives all
rent, B owns all patents and receives all rent, or both firms own some patents
and share the rent. In the first two cases the firm that owns all patents will
typically produce and earn a monopoly profit. However, the outcome in the
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third case depends on the rules and arrangements according to which patent
rights can be traded between firms.
We analye a benchmark case in which firms can freely trade exclusive
rights to use single patents and three other, more restricted regimes. In the
benchmark case, the sum of all contest efforts as a share in the firms’ rents
monotonically declines in the number of complementary patents, and quickly
converges towards zero if the number of patents becomes large. We then
compare this outcome with different patent trading regimes. Particularly,
we consider a regime in which patents cannot be traded, a regime in which
single patents can be licensed, but where the exclusive right to use the patent
cannot be transferred, and a regime in which the only way patent rights can
be traded is to form a patent pool that grants mutual rights to use all patents.
We find that the incentives to spend contest effort are the same for all these
arrangements, provided that the interior equilibrium exists. The firm profits
under these arrangements differ, however.
For a description of the process of patent races we use a simple and elegant
tool that has been developed in Baye and Hoppe (2003) who show that
an elementary Tullock (1980) contest is an adequate description of patent
races, and even fully equivalent to standard microeconomic descriptions of
stochastic patent races. This tool makes the consideration of multiple parallel
patent races between two firms particularly tractable.
2 The structure of the problem
Consider two firms A and B that compete with each other in the following
three stage game. In the first stage, the two firms spend efforts on R&D.
They need to innovate and patent n essential components of a new consumer
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good. Once these components are innovated and patented, the firms may
negotiate with each other about who is allowed to use which set of patents;
this is stage 2. Once these negotiations are over, if one or both firms are able
and allowed to produce the new good, a market game takes place in which
the firm(s) produce and sell the new good to consumers.
In the R&D stage, both firms simultaneously choose R&D expenditure
xi, yi ≥ 0 for each of the n single component contests. These effort choices
can be described by the vectors x ≡ (x1, ...xn) and y ≡ (y1, ...yn). Further,








A firm’s effort in an R&D contest typically has two effects that relate
to two different sources of uncertainty, as described by Loury (1979). First,
R&D is genuinely a risky activity, as it is uncertain whether and when own
research effort will yield the desired information. This type of uncertainty
may be called ’technological uncertainty’. Second, as other firms search for
the same information, there is some uncertainty about who innovates first,
and, hence, receives the patent. In line with Loury (1979) we call this the
’market uncertainty’. Both types of uncertainty are important.
In what follows we concentrate on market uncertainty. We assume that
the information how to produce component i is eventually revealed, for any
levels of effort. However, the probability that firm A gets hold of the relevant
information about component i prior to firm B and wins the patent, is a




if min{xi, yi} > 0, and pi = 1/2 otherwise. (2)
This description of a firm’s market uncertainty in the R&D contest between
two firms can be justified using an important equivalence result that has
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been developed by Baye and Hoppe (2003). They show that many types of
innovation contest and patent race in which the process of innovation fol-
lows a stochastic process can be represented equivalently as a simple lottery
contest in which the contestants’ win probabilities equal their shares in ag-
gregate expenditure, and in which the value of winning the lottery prize is
a function of the aggregate contest efforts that depends more specifically on
the properties of the stochastic process. For some stochastic processes the
lottery prize is a constant with respect to aggregate efforts. We concentrate
on this case which corresponds to considering only market uncertainty.
Once the efforts are chosen, the random process that is governed by win
probabilities (2) allocates the patents on the components i = 1, ...n to the
two firms. We assume that the random processes that determine the win
probabilities in the different components are stochastically independent of
each other.
When firms enter stage 2, the situation is described by effort vectors x
and y and by a vector z = (z1, ...zn) that describes the outcome of the n
patent contests, where zi = a if A wins the patent on component i and
zi = b if B wins the patent on component i. In stage 2 firms enter into
negotiations in which they can reallocate their patent rights and pay each
other compensation. We will consider several negotiation regimes, starting
with a regime in which all firms are perfectly and completely informed and in
which no contractual restrictions exist as regards the reallocation of patent
rights and compare the outcome with a situation in which restrictions on
contractual arrangements exist.
When the patent rights are finally allocated, the firms enter into a market
stage. A firm may produce and compete in the market if it has the right to
use all components. If none of the firms has the right to use all components,
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then no production will take place. If only one firm has the right to use all
components, this firm will be a monopolist. If both firms have these rights,
they will both produce and compete in a duopoly.
3 Solving for an equilibrium
We now solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium and consider first the final
stage.
Product market competition There are two firms and they are sym-
metric in all respects, except for their patent rights. Each firm can produce
only if it holds the rights to use all n technology components. If none of the
firms has access to all technology components, none of the firms can produce
and both firms earn zero profits in the product market.
If only one firm has access to all technology components, this firm is a
monopolist and will earn the monopoly rent which is denoted as FM . Con-
sumer rent under monopoly will be denoted CM . By symmetry, these values
do not depend on which firm is the monopolist.
If both firms have access to all technology components, the firms will
compete and each firm will earn the equilibrium profit in duopoly, denoted
by FD. Aggregate consumer rent in the duopoly is denoted as CD. We do not
specify the market structure further, and the values of profits and consumer
rents may result from Bertrand competition, Cournot competition or other
types of competition in the product market. We will assume, however, that
the firm’s monopoly rent exceeds the sum of the firms’ profits in a duopoly,
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and that consumer rents in the monopoly are smaller than in the duopoly:
FM > 2FD, CM < CD, and
FM + CM < 2FD + CD.
(3)
These conditions are typically fulfilled, for instance, for Cournot or Bertrand
competition.
Unconstrained barganing Turn now to stage 2 that follows the R&D
contests and that takes place prior to market competition. Firms enter into
this stage with their respective collections of patents.1 In the absence of
information asymmetries or contractual constraints between firms, the two
firms will end up with an allocation of their patents that maximizes the sum
of the joint profits they can obtain in the market competition in stage 3.
If z = (a, a, ...a) or if z = (b, b, ...b) , then the firm that holds all patents
will not turn all patent rights over to the other firm unless the price paid
by the other firm is at least equal to FM or higher, but FM is the maximum
of what the other firm is willing to pay. Hence, the payoffs of firms in the
respective continuation games are
πA(x,y, z) = FM − x
πB(x,y, z) = −y
⎫⎬⎭ if z = (a, a, ...a)
πA(x,y, z) = −x
πB(x,y, z) = FM − y
⎫⎬⎭ if z = (b, b, ...b).
(4)
If each firm holds at least one patent, to determine side payments between
firms, we need to adopt a more specific bargaining concept. Many bargain-
ing concepts will yield the same outcome, given the assumption about risk
1Implicitly we rule out that consumers take part in bargaining. While this is plausible,
given their much higher transaction cost, it is not crucial for the qualitative findings we
have on the R&D contest.
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neutrality of firms and symmetry. For simplicity, we assume symmetric Nash
bargaining among risk-neutral firms. Let firms have zero profits as their out-
side options. Then the surplus from efficient negotiations is the monopoly
profit FM and they share this evenly in the Nash bargaining solution. Hence,




− x and πB = FM
2
− y. (5)
The contest for patents We now turn to the multi-component R&D
contest in stage 1. With efficient bargaining after the patent contest, the
expected profit of firm A is a function of the two firms’ contest efforts. Using

















and x the sum of firm A’s component contest efforts as defined in (1). Firm
A receives the monopoly rent if it wins all patents, which explains the
additional payoff described by the second term in (6), and firm A does not
receive any rent if firm B wins all patents, which explains the third, negative
term on the right hand side. Finally, the firm has to pay the sum of its
efforts in the n parallel component contests, and this constitutes the fourth
term on the right-hand side. Equation (6) uses that the payoff is the same
for all outcomes in which both firms win at least one patent, no matter how
asymmetric is the distribution of patents in this case.2 Maximizing (6) with
2An interesting generalization of our approach addresses a situation in which the
patents are not essential, in which case production cost may simply be a function of
the number of patents which a firm is allowed to use. However, the linearly-limitational
case we consider yields stark results and is of particular interest.
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respect to xk and then evaluating at a symmetric situation with xk = yk






for all i = 1, ...n. (7)
This effort is strictly positive. Note also that this condition is sufficient







In the Appendix it is shown that the second order conditions for x∗i as in (7)
describe a local maximum. We summarize this result as follows.
Proposition 1 A subgame perfect equilibrium of the multi-component patent
race with efficient bargaining between two firms is described by monopoly in
the product market, and efficient bargaining that allocates patent rights such
that only one firm can produce. An interior symmetric equilibrium in the
patent race for n component patents is described by efforts as in (7)
The two firms’ total effort in all component contests sums up to




This sum has its maximum for n = 1 and is strictly decreasing in n. More-
over, this sum converges towards zero if n becomes very large. Intuitively, if
many complementary patents are needed to produce a particular good, even
if one firm, say A, spends much effort on each of the component contests,
it becomes very likely that both firms fail to obtain all patents. In each of
these cases firm A receives FM/2, independently of whether it holds 1, 2, or
even n − 1 patents. This makes it less worthwhile to spend much effort in
the simultaneous contests.
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Whether the reduction in effort that goes along with a larger n is desirable
or not is difficult to evaluate. R&D effort is wasteful from a social point of
view in this framework, as we focus on market uncertainty and disregard
technological uncertainty. Firms would maximize their joint profits here if
they choose the smallest possible amounts of efforts.3
4 Alternative patent trade regimes
In what follows we discuss deviations from the benchmark case in the previous
section and consider regimes in which patent trade is restricted in different
ways.
No patent trade Consider first the most severe patent trade restrictions
one could think of: suppose patents cannot be traded at all. The only case in
which production can take place in stage 3 is when one firm wins all patents.





FM − x, (9)
and equivalently for firm B. A firm wins only if it wins all patents, and if the
different component contests are mutually independent, this is the product
of the win probabilities for all patents i = 1, ...n.
3In a more general framework, there are also reasons why firms spend too little on R&D
from a social point of view. Whether the different pieces of information that are needed
to produce the product are found is often uncertain. The probability of innovation will
typically be an increasing function in the R&D efforts of firms. Accordingly, the firms’
monopoly rent and the consumer rents will typically be functions of R&D efforts. Profit
maximizing firms take only some of these effects into consideration. From a social point
of view, R&D effort may be too high or too low in a more general framework that adds
technological uncertainty to the picture.
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Maximization of this payoff with respect to xk yields n identical first-order













´2 FM − 1. (10)







Efforts and aggregate effort in this equilibrium is exactly the same as in the
equilibrium without any restrictions on patent trade:
Proposition 2 Prohibition of trade of exclusive patent rights between the
firms does not change the contest effort in a symmetric interior equilibrium
of the multi-patent contest.
Despite this similarity with respect to the contest stage, the equilibrium
payoffs differ from those in the benchmark case. Aggregate profit in the
interior equilibrium with efforts for as in (11):









For n = 2, this payoff is smaller than if patent trade is unconstrained. Firms
spend the same amount of R&D, but each firm wins the monopoly rent only
with probability 1/4, if patents cannot be traded. Firms and consumers are
worse off ex-ante for n = 2, if patents cannot be traded. For n > 2, the profit
(12) becomes negative, and symmetric effort as in (11) does not constitute
an equilibrium in this case.
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Selective patent licensing agreements Suppose now that firms can
agree on sharing patents but cannot establish exclusive user rights on patents
that have been traded, or restrict each firm’s use of the patent in other ways.4
Perhaps surprisingly, this leads to equilibrium R&D efforts and payoffs that
are the same as in the unconstrained benchmark regime.
If one firm wins all patents, this firm will become a monopolist, like in
the framework with free trade.
If, instead, each firm wins at least 1 patent, efficient negotiations will
take place as follows. For each single patent, firms can negotiate the right
to jointly use a patent for each single patent. An agreement that maximizes
their joint surplus that is compatible with the restriction on patent sharing
is as follows. Suppose firm A wins patents 1...m and firm B wins patents
m + 1, ...n. In this case one of the firms may offer the other firm the right
to join in the use of all its patents, or not vice versa, but not mutually. For
instance, A may sell the right to make use of the technology components
1, ...m, and ask for a fee equal to FM
2
in this case, whereas firm B sticks to
its exclusive rights to use patents m+1, ...n. As a result, B will be the only
firm that is able to produce the good, and will earn the monopoly profit.
This outcome is an equilibrium of any subgame in which both firms hold at
least one patent. It maximizes the total payoff of the two firms, as it leads
to the monopoly profit, and, as in the benchmark case, it shares this profit
between the two firms. Accordingly, the objective functions of firms at the
contest stage are the same as in the benchmark case. We summarize this as
4One such restriction could be a limit on the number of units of the good which the
licensee is allowed to produce using a particular technology component. Such licensing
arrangements are not uncommon and are seemingly anti-competitive. Note, however, that
such arrangements are not needed here to obtain the monopoly outcome in the equilibrium.
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Proposition 3 Trade restrictions that allow only for selective patent licens-
ing agreements between the firms do not change the contest effort in a sym-
metric interior equilibrium of the multi-patent contest.
Patent pools Consider a different regime that is more restrictive with
respect to which contractual arrangements are feasible. We again rule out
contracts that transfer exclusive user rights for a patent from one firm to the
other. We also rule out patent specific contracts as regards making use of a
particular patent. Instead, firms may either keep the patents they have and
and use them exclusively, or they may pool all information and patent rights
they have, like in a grand patent pool.
If one firm exclusively owns the patent rights for all n components, se-
quential rationality in stages 2 and 3 will imply that the firms do not form a
patent pool, but the firm that owns all patents will produce as a monopolist
in stage 3 and earn the monopoly profit FM .
If each firm owns at least one patent, if they do not form a patent pool
each firm will earn zero profits in the market game. If, instead, the firms form
a patent pool, both firms can produce in the market game. The outcome in
the market game is described by competition between duopolists. Each firm
earns FD.
Turning to stage 1, for reasons of symmetry, we can consider the payoff
for one firm. Firm A’s objective function is








FD − x. (13)
Firm A receives the duopoly profit in all patent allocations that emerge from
the contest stage, except if firm A wins all patents or if firm A wins none
of the patents. The first exception yields an additional payoff for firm A
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equal to (FM − FD) and the exception occurs with the probability that is
described by the ratio term in the second term on the right hand side of
(13). The second exception yields firm A a payoff of zero, as the other firm
has all patents. This is described by the third term in (13). Finally, and as
in previous cases, the firm has to pay for the efforts in the n parallel R&D
contests, and this constitutes the fourth term on the right-hand side.




i=1 (xi+yi)− i6=k(xi+yi) i=ni=1 xi
( i=ni=1 (xi+yi))






2 FD − 1 = 0







Again, the effort choice in a symmetric interior equilibrium is the same as
in the regime in which exclusive patent rights can be traded freely, whereas
the equilibrium payoffs differ. The payoff is equal to FD + 12n (FM − FD) −
1
2n
FD − nFM2n+1 which is equal to








This payoff is positive for n = 1 and non-negative for n = 2. Whether it is
positive or negative for larger values of n depends upon the relative size of





2n+1 − 4 . (15)
The ratio on the right hand side peaks at n = 3 (it is about 0.0833), and
decreases (rapidly) in n thereafter, and whether this condition is fulfilled
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depends on the type of competition in a duopoly. Consumers gain from
this regime compared to unconstrained trade of exclusive patent rights if the
symmetric interior equilibrium exists, as the product is always supplied by
at least one firm in both regimes, but the market is monopolized if exclusive
patent rights can be traded without any restrictions, and a patent pool leads
to a duopoly with a considerable probability which becomes ever larger if the
number of patents is higher. This is summarized as a proposition:
Proposition 4 If firms cannot trade single patent rights, but can form a
grand patent pool, condition (15) characterizes a necessary condition for the
symmetric interior R&D contest equilibrium to exist. In this equilibrium they
spend the same contest effort as with free patent trade. Firm payoffs are lower
and consumer rents are higher than in the case with free patent trade.
To get an intuition whether condition (15) is likely to hold, we consider
Bertrand and Cournot competition with perfect substitutes. With Bertrand
competition between identical firms, FD = 0, and the condition fails, i.e., no
interior symmetric equilibrium at the contest stage for n > 2 exists. With
Cournot competition with homogenous products, constant marginal cost and
linear demand, FD/FM = 4/9, and participants make positive payoffs for all
n.
5 Conclusions
The number of patents that are used for single consumer products is con-
siderable, for many standard products. In this paper we considered R&D
contests if firms need n complementary patent rights for components from
which they can produce a consumer good. We show that this complemen-
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tarity generally weakens the incentives to invest in R&D effort. If firms can
freely trade the rights to use each single of these n patents, for large n, the
sum of all R&D effort in all component contests reduces to zero. Intuitively,
if many complementary patents are needed to produce a particular good,
even if one firm spends much effort on each of the component contests, it
becomes very likely each firm fails to obtain all patents. But if each of the
firms obtains at least one patent, this patent yields veto power, and a firm’s
payoff is therefore the same whether it holds 1, 2, or even n−1 patents. This
makes it less worthwhile to spend much effort in the n simultaneous contests.
We also show that this result is robust with respect to alternative trading
regimes among patent holders. Particularly, if patent rights cannot be traded
at all, or if exclusive rights in patents cannot be traded, but patents can
only be licensed, or if firms can only enter into a general patent sharing
arrangement (a ’patent pool’), the marginal incentives to spend effort in the
simultaneous component contests remain unchanged. The profits for firms
are lower in these regimes, however, and these marginal incentives need not
characterize an interior equilibrium if the number n of components becomes
large.
From a consumer point of view, among the regimes we study, the patent
pool yields the highest consumer rents, provided that n is small enough
such that the interior symmetric contest equilibrium is sustained under this
regime.
Several extensions and generalizations would be interesting to look at.
One would like to allow for more than two competing firms, or allow for
asymmetry between firms. Further, it would be interesting to allow for tech-
nological uncertainty, in addition to the market uncertainty. However, in
the context used here, the complexity of the problem increases more than
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linearly in these dimensions, and we leave this to future research.
6 Appendix
A1: Consider the second-order conditions for x and y as in (7) to describe
a local payoff maximum for the respective firm given that the other firm
chooses their effort according to (7). The second order derivatives of the
















= 0. Hence, the Hessian is a diagonal




















for firm A, and analogously for B. The determinant of this matrix is the
product of the diagonal elements, so that the determinant of the first leading
principal minor has negative sign, the second positive and so alternating.
Hence, the conditions for a local maximum at the symmetric situation are
fulfilled.
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